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In Brief
Sowden et al. demonstrate how a
mechanism involved in inhibiting
imitation and in perspective taking
extends to lie detection. They show that
inconsistency between the opinions of
the self and another impedes lie detection
and that electrical stimulation of the
temporoparietal junction improves
performance in these opinion-
inconsistent situations.
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The ability to detect deception is of vital importance
in human society, playing a crucial role in communi-
cation, cooperation, and trade between societies,
businesses, and individuals. However, numerous
studies have shown, remarkably consistently, that
we are only slightly above chance when it comes to
detecting deception [1]. Here we investigate whether
inconsistency between one’s own opinion and the
stated opinion of another impairs judgment of the ve-
racity of that statement, in the same way that one’s
ownmental, affective, and action states, when incon-
sistent, can interfere with representation of those
states in another [2]. Within the context of lie detec-
tion, individuals may be less accurate when judging
the veracity of another’s opinion when it is inconsis-
tent with their own opinion. Here we present a video-
mediated lie-detection task to confirm this predic-
tion: individuals correctly identified truths or lies
less often when the other’s expressed opinion was
inconsistent with their own (experiment 1). Transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) has previously been shown to
improve the ability to selectively represent the self or
another [3–5]. We therefore predicted that TPJ stim-
ulation would enable lie detectors to inhibit their own
views, enhance those of the other, and improve their
ability to determine whether another was presenting
their true opinion. Experiment 2 confirmed this sec-
ond prediction: anodal tDCS of the TPJ improved
lie detection specifically when one’s own and others’
views were conflicting.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Despite the frequency of deception in everyday life [6] and the
importance of detecting deception within human society, hu-Current Biomans are remarkably consistent in their inability to detect
deception. Meta-analyses demonstrate a mean success rate
of 54% across all published studies of lie detection ability,
where chance performance is 50%, with a measurement-cor-
rected SD of just 0.8% [1]. Although one or two cues have
been demonstrated to signal deception at above-chance levels
in some studies (e.g., response latency [7]), these cues are
mostly overlooked in favor of non-diagnostic behavioral cues
(such as the avoidance of eye contact [8]) or person-level
cues relating to the perceived deceptiveness of the individual
rather than what they are saying (‘‘demeanor bias’’ [9]), result-
ing in poor performance. Here we investigate the existence of
a further factor that may decrease the accuracy of lie detection
when one is attempting to determine the veracity of another’s
stated opinion: inconsistency between one’s own opinion and
that of another.
It is well-established that self-representations can interfere
with representation of another even when task irrelevant. The
act of planning or executing an action interferes with the percep-
tion of an incongruent action performed by another [10], one’s
own affective state biases perception of another’s incongruent
affective state [11], one’s own visual perspective interferes with
the representation of another’s spatially inconsistent visual
perspective [12], and the contents of one’s own mental states
interfere with representation of those of another when they differ
from our own [13]. A body of previous research has highlighted
how each of these social abilities recruits a mechanism to enable
the individual to control, or switch between, representation of the
self and of others to avoid interference between inconsistent rep-
resentations, such that representation of the self is enhanced
and the other inhibited, or representation of the other is
enhanced and the self inhibited according to task demands
[14–18]. These results raise the possibility that holding an opinion
inconsistent with that expressed by another may interfere with
the ability to judge the veracity of the expressed opinion and
that increasing the ability to inhibit representation of one’s own
opinion and enhance that of the other may result in improved
lie-detection performance when opinions are inconsistent.
Accordingly, over two experiments, participants were asked to
complete a video-mediated lie-detection task based on the
false-opinion paradigm [19–21] (Figure 1A), in which they werelogy 25, 2447–2451, September 21, 2015 ª2015 The Authors 2447
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Experiment 1
Figure 1. Example Lie-Detection Trial,
Placement of Electrodes for rTPJ and MO
Groups, and Visual Display of the Results
(A) Example trial from the video-mediated lie-
detection task.
(B) Placement of anodal (red) and cathodal (blue)
electrodes for both the MO (left) and TPJ (right)
groups.
(C) Percentage accuracy when the veracity of
opinion statements consistent and inconsistent
with the participant’s own opinion was judged. The
data presented are from experiment 1 and the MO
and TPJ stimulation (experiment 2) groups. * de-
notes significant difference at p < 0.05, and error
bars represent the SEM.asked to rate whether an individual (the ‘‘sender’’) had expressed
their true or a false opinion.
Experiment 1 sought to establish evidence for the hypothe-
sized opinion inconsistency effect by comparing lie-detection
performance for opinion-consistent (where the participant’s
opinion matched the sender’s stated opinion) and opinion-
inconsistent (where the participant’s opinion was opposite to
the sender’s stated opinion) statements. A group of healthy adult
volunteers (n = 63; mean age = 33.5, SD = 6.4; 44 female) were
asked to complete the lie-detection task after completing a
questionnaire ascertaining their views on a number of controver-
sial topics. As hypothesized, when rating the veracity of opinion
statements expressed by senders (i.e., whether the sender had
presented their true opinion), participants were significantly
more accurate when the view expressed by the sender was
consistent with their own view (mean percent accuracy ± SEM:
54.9% ± 0.8%) than when inconsistent (51.2% ± 1.1%; t(62) =
3.02, p = 0.004, d = 0.49).
Experiment 2 tested the efficacy of anodal transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS), a form of non-invasive electrical brain
stimulation, of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) to improve lie-
detection accuracy on opinion-inconsistent trials. A series of
recent studies suggest that the TPJ plays a crucial role in the
mechanism that enables the control of representations of the
self and of others [2–5, 15, 18]. These studies suggest the TPJ
allows representation of the self to be inhibited and the other
enhanced, or the self enhanced and the other inhibited, and
that this process is recruited in theory of mind, imitation inhibi-
tion, and visual perspective taking [17, 18, 22–25]. In line with
previous demonstrations across these different social domains,
it was predicted that stimulation of the TPJ would allow repre-
sentation of one’s own opinion to be inhibited and representation
of the other’s opinion to be enhanced, leading to a reduction in
the opinion inconsistency effect and improved lie-detection per-
formance on opinion-inconsistent trials.
Thirty-three healthy adult participants (mean age = 24.2, SD =
4.6; 18 female) underwent 20 min of tDCS, over either the right
TPJ (rTPJ) or a mid-occipital (MO) control region (Figure 1B),
prior to completing the same video-mediated lie-detection task
but after their own opinions were obtained. The two groups did
not differ in their age, gender, or opinions on the topics dis-2448 Current Biology 25, 2447–2451, September 21, 2015 ª2015 Thcussed (p > 0.05), and there was no significant difference in over-
all lie-detection performance between the two groups (t(31) =
0.93, p = 0.361). Moreover, overall performance (collapsing
across opinion-consistent and -inconsistent trials) did not differ
significantly from the population derived average of 54% [1] in
either the TPJ (t(15) = 1.18, p = 0.257) or MO (t(16) = 0.25, p =
0.804) group.
Lie-detection performance was then analyzed using a mixed-
effect two-way ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of opinion
consistency (two levels: performance on opinion-consistent
versus opinion-inconsistent trials) and a between-subjects
factor of stimulation group (two levels: stimulation of TPJ versus
MO). As predicted, there was a significant opinion consistency3
stimulation group interaction (F(1,31) = 7.74, p = 0.009, hP
2 =
0.20), whereby participants who underwent rTPJ stimulation
were significantly more accurate when the sender’s expressed
opinion was inconsistent with their own opinion (59.5% ±
1.6%) when compared to those administered MO control stimu-
lation (52.7% ± 1.2%; t(31) = 3.32, p = 0.002, d = 1.15).
Conversely, there was no significant difference in lie-detection
performance between stimulation groups during trials in which
the sender and participant’s opinions were consistent (t(31) =
1.03, p = 0.313; Figure 1C).
The significant improvement in lie detection after tDCS of the
TPJ, specific to situations in which one must suppress one’s
own opinion to judge the veracity of another’s statement, sup-
ports both the involvement of a self-other control mechanism
in lie detection and the involvement of the TPJ in this process.
Results suggest that in situations of conflict between one’s
own opinion and that of another, one must inhibit the represen-
tation of one’s own opinion and enhance that of the other in order
to successfully discriminate between a truth and a lie.
The relatively modest improvement in absolute accuracy
observed after TPJ stimulation is in accordance with both the
size of the consistency effect observed in experiment 1 and
the degree of individual differences in the population as a whole.
A mean success rate of 54% across all published studies (albeit
with an unknown proportion of opinion-consistent and -inconsis-
tent trials), with a measurement-corrected SD of just 0.8% [1],
means that the increase in lie detection ability after TPJ stimula-
tion is therefore not trivial with respect to population-levele Authors
statistics. Indeed, the mean percentage accuracy of the TPJ
stimulation group on opinion-inconsistent trials was significantly
greater than the population-derived figure of 54% (t(15) = 3.33,
p = 0.005, d = 1.17) but on consistent trials was not (t(15) =
0.46, p = 0.651). Accuracy in the MO stimulation group did not
differ significantly from 54% on either consistent or inconsistent
trials (p > 0.05).
These data are promising for understanding the mechanisms
involved in, and factors affecting, lie-detection performance.
However, care should be taken when considering the use of
tDCS to improve lie detection in real-world situations, where
even the 87% lie-detection accuracy achieved by polygraphs
[26] does not ensure that truths are not flagged as lies and vice
versa—especially in situations where the base rate of lying is
likely to be low, such as in employment screening. Also, although
the time course of the improvement in lie detection was not
measured in this study, it is likely to be short lived: with the stim-
ulation parameters used in the current experiment, one would
only expect effects to last for approximately 90 min [27]. Thus,
it seems that much of the value of these results lies in their theo-
retical implications for the processes involved in lie detection, for
the applicability of self-other control mechanisms to higher-level
social cognition, and for our knowledge of TPJ function.
The specificity of the improvement in lie detection (on opinion-
inconsistent trials only) suggests that stimulation does not act on
a general process involved in social cognition, such as theory of
mind [28] or emotion recognition [29]. Rather, the results are best
explained in the context of the mechanism of self-other control.
Self-other control has been shown to underlie the role of the TPJ
in various social functions on the basis of organic lesions [25],
experimentally induced disruption [30], and facilitation [3–5] of
TPJ function and through the use of neuroimaging methods
such as fMRI [14].
With regard to the full mechanism by which opinion inconsis-
tency produces impaired lie-detection performance, it is plau-
sible that individuals who hold strong opinions for or against a
topic have been exposed to similar arguments in support of their
position and against the opposite view [31], allowing them to
recognize the match between a position and the most common
justifications for that position when a sender has an opinion
consistent with their own. If individuals are presented with an
opinion counter to their own, their lack of experience relating
to justifications supporting that stance on the topic means they
may be ill equipped to judge the appropriateness of the justifica-
tion and therefore the veracity of the stated opinion. It is impor-
tant to realize, however, that the effect of TPJ stimulation is
unlikely to be attributable wholly to inhibition of one’s own
opinion: if inhibition were the only effect of stimulation, then per-
formance on inconsistent trials would have been equivalent,
rather than superior, to performance on consistent trials.
Instead, results suggest that representation of the other was
also enhanced, in line with previous findings on self-other control
and TPJ stimulation [3–5] and with theories attributing an atten-
tional, switching, or gating role to the TPJ [16, 32, 33]. A neces-
sary subsequent focus for research is to identify the mechanism
by which an enhanced representation of the other results in an
increased ability to detect lies.
In conclusion, experiment 1 established self-other interference
effects in the context of lie detection, where representations referCurrent Bioto the opinions of the self and the other. Participants were less
accurate at distinguishing truthful from false opinions when the
sender’s opinion was inconsistent with their own. Experiment 2
demonstrated that this performance interference effect could
be reduced through anodal stimulation of TPJ, improving lie
detection specifically on those trials in which this effect was
most prominent. These results suggest that boosting the ability
to control representations of the self and other—in this case in-
hibiting one’s own opinion in order to more accurately represent
that of the other—can improve lie detection in opinion-inconsis-
tent situations.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Lie-Detection Task
In both experiments 1 and 2, participants began by completing an ‘‘opinion
questionnaire’’ in which they gave their opinion on 20 topics. For each item
they rated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the topic on a
six-point scale (with an answer of ‘‘1’’ demonstrating strong agreement, and
‘‘6’’ strong disagreement, with a topic). Example items on the questionnaire
include ‘‘euthanasia,’’ ‘‘medical abortion,’’ ‘‘genetically modified foodstuffs,’’
and ‘‘animal testing.’’ During the lie-detection task, participants watched a se-
ries of 80 randomly ordered video clips of individuals (‘‘senders’’) expressing
their views, as well as a brief justification of their view, on the same topics
included in the opinion questionnaire. These took the form of ‘‘I am in favor
of euthanasia because everyone deserves a chance to die with dignity.’’ After
watching each video, participants were asked to rate whether the sender had
presented their true opinion or whether they had lied, on a 6-point scale (1, defi-
nitely true; 6, definitely lie; see Figure 1A). The task took a total of 25 min.
The stimulus set comprised the same set of 40 truthful and 40 deceptive
statements for all participants, conveyed by 20 different individuals (ten males
and ten females). The stimulus set contained four video statements about
each of the 20 topics contained in the opinion questionnaire—two truths
and two lies—and in a fully factorial design, two statements were spoken in
agreement and two in disagreement with each topic. The videos were re-
corded during a previous experiment and were all provided by individuals
who had strong opinions for or against each topic (ratings of ‘‘1’’ or ‘‘6’’ on
the opinion questionnaire). Note that the factorial combination of truthful
and deceptive statements, for and against each topic, means that the
observed improvement in lie detection performance on opinion-inconsistent
trials after stimulation is an effect on accuracy rather than bias in both exper-
iment 1 and experiment 2.
Data Analysis
Trials were divided into opinion-consistent and opinion-inconsistent trials on a
trial-by-trial basis according to the sender’s expressed opinion and the partic-
ipant’s opinion as reported on the opinion questionnaire. For example, if a
participant listed their opinion as ‘‘against’’ a topic, a trial in which the sender
expressed their opinion as ‘‘against’’ the topic was classed as an opinion-
consistent trial, whereas a trial in which the sender expressed their opinion
as ‘‘for’’ the topic was classed as an opinion-inconsistent trial. Participants’ re-
sponses on each trial were dichotomized as either a ‘‘truth’’ (reponses 1–3) or a
‘‘lie’’ (responses 4–6) judgment to account for individual differences in the use
of the extremities of the rating scale. The percentage accuracy of judgments
constituted the measure of lie detection performance, which was compared
in experiment 1 for opinion-consistent and -inconsistent trials using a
paired-sample t test. In experiment 2, lie-detection performance was analyzed
using a mixed-effect two-way ANOVA (with opinion consistency as the within-
subjects factor and stimulation group as the between-subjects factor). Two
participants were excluded prior to data analysis in experiment 2: one from
the TPJ stimulation group, who responded ‘‘true’’ to over 90% of trials, and
one from the MO stimulation group, who completed less than 20% of trials,
leaving too few trials for analysis.
It should be noted that the design of both experiment 1 and experiment 2 fol-
lowed current best practice guidelines by comparing lie detection perfor-
mance on the critical condition of interest (opinion-inconsistent trials) with alogy 25, 2447–2451, September 21, 2015 ª2015 The Authors 2449
within-participant baseline (opinion-consistent trials), which also served as an
extremely closely matched control condition. Indeed, participants were per-
forming the same task, to videotaped statements from the same people, con-
cerning the same topics, on both opinion-consistent and opinion-inconsistent
trials.
Experiment 2 tDCS Protocol
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two tDCS groups: rTPJ (n = 17)
or MO control (n = 18). All participants were healthy volunteers, with no known
developmental or neurological disorders, normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and no contraindications to tDCS. Prior to study completion, all partic-
ipants were naive to the aims of the experiment.
All participants underwent anodal stimulation, induced with two saline-
soaked surface sponge electrodes (35 cm2) and delivered by a battery-driven,
constant current stimulator. According to group assignment, the anodal elec-
trodewas placed over central parietal 6 (CP6) for rTPJ stimulation and occipital
zero (OZ) for MO control stimulation (electroencephalography 10/20 system).
MO was used as an active control site as there was no a priori reason to as-
sume that stimulation to this region would differ from baseline. The cathodal
electrode was placed over the vertex as a reference point, individually
measured on each participant (Figure 1B). A weak electrical current (1 mA)
was delivered offline (preceding the task) for a total of 20 min, following the
procedure used by Santiesteban and colleagues [4, 5], as these effects are re-
ported to be more robust than online stimulation. The effects of stimulation
with these parameters have been demonstrated to last for 90 min after stimu-
lation [27]. Participants completed the opinion questionnaire prior to stimula-
tion, whereas the lie detection task was completed within the critical 90 min
window after stimulation. Both experiments 1 and 2 received full ethical
approval by the local Research Ethics Committees (Birkbeck, University of
London and Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Neuroscience, King’s
College London, respectively).
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